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The creation 
and evolution of criminal law in colonial 
and post-colonial societies 
Leslie Sebba1 
Theoretical models of the legislative process are explored in order to seek 
an explanation of the phenomenon whereby post-colonial democracies 
frequently retain the legislation adopted by the imperial predecessor. This 
even applies to criminal codes, in spite of their presumed role in the 
controlling of colonial populations. A possible explanation is proffered in 
terms of a bureaucratic model of legislation, which seems to fit both colonial 
powers and some democracies. Under this model, the character and content 
of the legislation may depend as much upon the personalities involved in its 
drafting and promotion, as upon political or structural factors. 
Cet article examine différents modèles théoriques relatifs au processus 
législatif afin de rechercher l'explication du fait que les démocraties post-
coloniales conservent fréquemment la législation édictée par le pouvoir 
colonial antérieur. Ce constat vaut même pour les codes pénaux en dépit de 
leur supposée vocation à contrôler les populations colonisées. L'une des 
explications possibles repose sur un modèle législatif "bureaucratique" qui 
paraît s'appliquer aussi bien au pouvoir colonial qu'à certaines démocraties. 
Dans ce modèle, le type et le contenu du droit peut dépendre tout autant des 
personnalités chargées de l'élaborer et de la promouvoir que de facteurs 
politiques ou structurels. 
The original focus of this research was the creation and evolution of criminal law in past-colonial societies - with special emphasis on Israel. However, 
one of the most striking (and seemingly surprising) features of the development of 
law in these societies is the fact that in many cases they have substantially retained 
the criminal codes enacted by the colonial power. Thus, rather than limiting the 
focus to the non-creation (or retention) of criminal law in these societies, it seemed 
appropriate to broaden the topic so as to include the creation of the laws generally 
prevailing today - by extending the analysis to the colonial phase of development. 
In the result, this historical phase became the focus of the study. 
The topic under discussion here does not fit easily into a developed academic 
tradition. For while "it has long been recognized that the systematic study of the 
1
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social and legal context of legislation is an important means of understanding law 
and the legal process"2, relatively little has been achieved to implement this goal3. 
The growing literature on the sociology of law (or "law and society") lays relatively 
little emphasis on legislation, and much of the literature on legislation is concerned 
with its effects or its implementation rather than the process of its creation (ibid., 
p. 33). Studies of the creative processes are generally case-studies4 and give rise to 
methodological problems regarding their purpose: "These studies frequently 
vacillate between an effort to provide a comprehensive description of the passage of 
a law and an attempt to explain in causal terms why it was passed"5. 
Moreover, in the context of the criminal law, the topics selected for study are 
generally those forms of deviance, such as juvenile delinquency, drug abuse and 
sexual deviance, which attract the energies of moral entrepreneurs seeking the 
imposition of a medicalised form of criminal law6 - or, more recently, involved in 
victim advocacy7. These are fruitful areas for the analysis of issues related to social 
control, but they are located in the margins of the criminal law proper. 
Another type of approach has been to focus on the socio-legal functions of 
certain legal (mainly statutory) reforms in England, as seen in their historical 
perspective. Notable examples are the analyses by Jerome Hall (1952) of the law of 
theft, William Chambliss (1964) of the Vagrancy Laws and E.P. Thompson (1975) 
of the Black Act. These analyses tend to show how laws are created or manipulated 
by the ruling classes for the protection of their economic and political interests. This 
approach, as indicated, lays emphasis on the socio-political function of the legal 
development concerned, rather than the processes of its adoption. 
Most of the above-mentioned literature has been concerned with the analysis of 
legislation in Western democracies. There is some (largely anthropological) 
literature relating to the imposition of law on colonized peoples8, but here the 
emphasis is on the conflict between the imposed and the traditional norms, rather 
than on the legislative processes9. 
The studies referred to above tend to focus on particular legislative enactments 
or reforms rather than comprehensive codifications of the law. Codification 
(including the processes involved in its adoption) has also been the subject of 
academic analysis10. This literature, however, tends to be inward-looking, in that it 
sees the legislative processes as autonomous, rather than as a testing-ground for 
broadly-based sociological theories. 
2
 Tomasic (1980, p. 19). 
3
 See, however, the useful integrative surveys conducted by Tomasic (1980) and Hagan (1980), as well 
as the more recent work by Chambliss (1993) and his colleagues in the framework of the Society for 
the Study of Social Problems. 
4
 A notable exception is the pioneering study by Berk, Brackman and Lesser (1977) of changes in the 
Californian Penal Code between 1955-1971. 
5
 Hagan (1980, p. 623). 
6
 Cf. Hagan (1980). 
7
 Rock (1986); McCoy (1993); Scheingold, et al. (1994). 
8
 Notably Burman and Harrell-Bond (1979). 
9
 There is, of course, an extensive political science literature relating to the political aspects of the 
legislative process (see, e.g., the Legislative Studies Quarterly), but this literature adopts a very 
different perspective, laying emphasis on the respective roles of various institutions pertaining to the 
constitutional scheme. 
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 See, e.g. - in the context of criminal law codification - Kadish (1978) and Friedland (1984). 
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THEORIES OF LEGISLATION 
The traditional analysis distinguishing between two hypotheses applicable to the 
role of law in society - the functional and Marxist, or "consensus" and "conflict" 
hypotheses11 has been applied specifically to the legislative process. Thus Hagan in 
his analysis of sociological studies of legislation differentiated between the "moral 
functionalists", who regard the law as an expression of "values and customs that are 
widely shared in society", and the "moral Marxists", for whom "'the legal system is 
an apparatus that is created to serve the interests of the dominant class'"12. Tomasic, 
however, added a further dimension to this analysis13. He differentiated between 
those analyses in which the dichotomy was based upon values (consensus versus 
conflict) and those in which the criterion was interests - contrasting interest group 
theories which are elitist in orientation with those adopting a pluralistic approach. 
This analysis gave rise to a whole matrix of possible theoretical orientations based 
upon the above classifications14. Ultimately, however, it seems that the consensus-
versus-conflict dichotomy is implicit in both the "value" and the "interest group" 
approaches. 
The above approaches seem all to be deterministic, legislation being perceived 
as the outcome of vested interests, and reflecting either a synthesis of such interests 
under the consensus-functionalist approach, or those of the dominant forces under 
the Marxist-conflict approach. Chambliss (1993, p. 9), too, sees law creation as the 
"resolution of contradictions, conflicts and dilemmas...inherent in the structure of a 
particular political, economic and social structure"; but his reference to "dilemmas" 
and his emphasis on the processual aspect of law-making suggest a "softer" model, 
and this is confirmed by the incorporation of "human agency" into this model15. 
Indeed, Chambliss adopts a "dialectical methodology" which "grants a role to 
choice, intentions, and the like (even envisioning a freely chosen future)"16 - albeit 
limited by the structural constraints referred to. In the case-studies referred to, 
however, the "human agency" element tends to remain abstract, and seems to be 
relating to interest-groups and other sub-sections of the population, rather than 
personalities. 
"Personalities" are, however, one of the key elements in the analytical studies of 
law reform conducted by Martin Friedland (1984). Friedland, rather than invoking 
sweeping sociological theories, sees law reform as the result of "politics, 
personalities and pressure groups" (p. 44). In the context of contemporary law-
making, he refers to the "constant interplay between public opinion, pressure groups 
and influential individuals" (p. 74). This analysis implies an open and non-
deterministic legislative system - although passing reference is made to "the 
possibility of inordinate influence by powerful pressure groups..." (p. 112). It may 
thus be appropriate to name this construct a democratic model, which may in 
substance be regarded as a variant on the functionalist theme. 
1 1
 See, e.g., McDonald (1976). 
1 2
 Hagan (1980, p. 604-605), citing Richard Quinney. 
1 3
 See also Chambliss (1993) who identifies two derivatives of the functionalist and Marxist 
approaches, which he refers to as "pluralist" and "ruling class" theories. 
1 4
 Tomasic (1980, p. 27). 
1 5
 Zatz, (1993, p. x). 
1 6
 J. Kenneth Benson, cited in Chambliss (1993, p. 9). 
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The above-mentioned approaches all seem to assume that the legislative process 
is characterized by a high degree of purposefulness17 and rationality, deriving either 
from fundamental features of the socio-economic structure, or at least from the 
explicit views of articulate sections of the population. This is true both of the 
radical/Marxist/conflict analyses, which perceive this process as a conspiracy on the 
part of certain powerful elements in the social structure to further their self-seeking 
goals and interests, and of the consensus/functionalist/democratic analyses, which 
see the process as a framework designed to ensure that the final legislative product 
will reflect a fine balance between competing interest groups, thereby achieving if 
not consensus in the literal sense, at least a sort of lowest common denominator. 
Consideration should also be given, however, to the possibility that legislative 
processes do not possess such rational and purposeful characteristics. Two such 
models may be envisaged. These models derive essentially from anecdotal evidence 
and are proposed somewhat tentatively; but at least one of the models will he highly 
pertinent to the subsequent discussion of colonial legislation. 
The first of these models may he termed the bureaucratic model18. Under some 
parliamentary systems, including those following the Westminster model, parlia-
mentary business, and in particular the bills which are ultimately adopted, are 
generated primarily by the government of the day19. The ministers of which these 
governments are composed rely, in turn, upon their senior advisers for this purpose. 
Thus, while a British minister might he largely motivated to introduce new 
legislation20, the content of this legislation will generally be determined largely by 
public servants; "...most legislation is conceived, drafted and all but enacted in 
Whitehall"21. Even where the legislation adopted follows from the recommen-
dations of various public bodies (such as law reform committees), these bodies may 
also have included or have been influenced by officials. The procedure described 
here is a far cry from Dicey's image of a constitutional and substantially consensual 
process in which the dominating force is public opinion22. This phenomenon, i.e., 
the focal role of the civil servant in the governmental process (in substance the 
theme of the popular TV series "Yes, Minister"), has been the subject of academic 
analysis in recent times23; but relatively little emphasis has been placed in this 
context on the legislative process. 
Specific evidence of this phenomenon is found in an account of the adoption of 
criminal justice legislation in England, where "It's not generally realized that civil 
servants brief their ministers not just behind the scenes but while actual debates are 
going on on the floor or in committee"24. It seems clear from the illustrations (in the 
context of criminal justice) provided by this source that the civil servant rather than 
the Minister is the guiding force behind legislative reform. In Israel, too, a 
1 7
 Cf . the discussion by Kidder (1979) of the relevance of intent in the imposition of law. 
1 8
 Cf. Chambliss (1976, p. 87). 
1 9
 Mezey (1979), in his comparative analysis of political systems, characterizes the legislatures of the 
type referred to here as "reactive". 
2 0
 Zander (1994, p. 5). 
2 1
 Miers and Page (1990, p. 39). 
2 2
 Cf. Tomasic (1980). 
2 3
 See Potter (1986), and the references therein on p. 11, fn.22. 
2 4
 Professor Anthony King, cited in Zander (1994, p. 59). 
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perceptive jurist drew attention, in a short monograph devoted to this topic, to the 
critical role of the ministerial legal adviser in the creation of legislation25. 
This model of the legislative process may be less appropriate in the context of 
political systems in which the legislature has a greater degree of independence from 
the executive arm, such as the United States26. Moreover, the emphasis under the 
bureaucratic model is very different from Friedland's attribution of law reform to 
"politics, personalities and pressure groups" (see above) - more particularly in that 
he adds "public opinion" to his list of main ingredients27. This may be partly 
explained by the emphasis in his analysis on Canada (although his model purports to 
be applicable to the U.K. too). It may also be true that the bureaucratic model is 
presently losing ground in an era of more participatory politics. 
It may also be argued that the dynamics of the legislative process described here 
are relevant mainly to what is sometimes known as "lawyers' law", rather than to 
areas of the law more closely related to controversial political issues, where the 
input will be wider. However, even if both this differentiation is valid and the 
conclusion correct, the model remains at least partially valid - and may apply in 
particular to criminal law (see below). If this is indeed the case, it raises questions 
about the validity - or at least the universality - of both the consensus and the 
conflict views of legislation; for legislation would reflect the view neither of the 
general public, nor of powerful interests groups in society, but of a handful of (or 
sometimes even individual) public servants. The actions of such individuals will, of 
course, reflect certain social, economic and political values (whether sectarian or 
consensual); but these will be applied in isolation from the broader political 
processes. 
What, indeed, would be the character of legislation emanating primarily from a 
bureaucrat? His (or her) natural inclination would be to antagonize as few persons 
as possible, and this might be expected to be reflected in the legislation. In rare 
cases, a secure official, taking pride in his or her professional background and/or 
competence, might attempt more ambitious reforms; and this might be true also of 
an outsider, called in from academic or private practice. These alternative roles -
which may he labelled the "obfuscated" and the "enlightened" bureaucrat - will be 
considered further in the course of the subsequent discussion of colonial legislation. 
The second - and more tentatively suggested - model is the fortuitousness 
model. Anecdotal evidence describes many haphazard (or even negligent) occur-
rences in the course of the legislative process, such as chance absences from votes 
(including votes in committee rooms - or even at plenary sessions, with only a 
handful of legislators participating), inattention to drafting, and errors in voting 
resulting from misunderstandings. Clearly such disarray may play a part in the 
nature or content of the legislation adopted. However, it seems unlikely that such 
forces actually dominate the legislative process. Thus, this model should perhaps be 
regarded as a force modifying the three previous models rather than as an 
independent model. 
2 5
 Bar-Niv (1971). See, generally, Sebba (1995), alluding also to the dominant role (particularly in the 
area of civil law) of the head of the legislation department in the Ministry of Justice. In recent years, 
however, greater initiative has passed to "private members" of the Knesset in the instigation of 
legislation, including criminal legislation (see ibid.). 
2 6
 Cf. Mezey (1979). 
2 7
 Friedland (1984, p. 74). 
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Four tentative models of the legislative process emerge from the foregoing 
discussion: (1) a (democratic) consensual model; (2) a (Marxist) conflict model; (3) 
a bureaucratic model; and (4) a "fortuitousness" model. The next question to 
consider is which of these models are relevant to the colonial situation. 
COLONIAL LEGISLATION 
Under a colonial regime the applicability of the democratic or consensual model 
is by definition precluded; laws are imposed by the mother country on a subject 
people. It is true that an enlightened colonial regime may endeavour to take account 
of the wishes of the local population (or at least of certain sectors of that population) 
when enacting new legislation. But whereas for Dicey taking account of public 
opinion was an essential feature of a democratic legal system, in the context of a 
colonial regime such considerations are at the rulers' discretion. Interest in 
ascertaining the views of the local population, if any, may derive not primarily from 
democratic ideology, but rather from pragmatic considerations, namely the desire 
that the law will be accepted and implemented with a minimum of friction and 
controversy28. 
On the other hand, the (Marxist) conflict model presents a more plausible model 
for the dynamics of colonial legislation. To colonial governments are attributed the 
desire to exploit the native population, to "divide and rule", and to maintain 
hegemony for its own sake (cf. Tomasic's "elite interest group" referred to above). 
The use of the instrument of law for this purpose clearly suggests itself, especially 
as wide powers of law-making rest with the colonial administration, with some 
control exercised by the home administration - but little intervention on the part of 
more democratic forces. In her conclusions to a survey of the literature on law and 
colonialism Merry (1991, p. 917) concludes that "Law often serves as the 
handmaiden for processes of domination, helping to create new systems of control 
and regulation". However, the more blatant expressions of repressive, and in 
particular exploitative, domination are found in land and labour law, rather than the 
criminal law. Such illustrations of the use of law to secure capitalist transformations 
in Rhodesia and Tanganyika may be found in Sumner's Crime, Justice and 
Underdevelopment (1982)29; but Sumner also notes the use of penal provisions 
(albeit not usually in the penal codes) for the purposes of the maximization of 
production and minimizing of costs, by creating forms of pseudo-slavery. 
Economic patterns and "strategies of rule" varied widely from colony to colony 
(Merry, 1991, p. 891), and the above illustrations may not be typical. It was 
nevertheless probably common for standard penal provisions to be widely drawn, to 
facilitate control of the local populations. Some illustrations from the legislative 
history of the Palestinian mandate appear to illustrate this phenomenon. The 
Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Arrest and Searches) of 1924 vested very wide 
powers of arrest in the Palestine police, while bestowing minimal rights and powers 
2 8
 Even for Lord Macaulay, whose enlightened views will be described below, the importance of taking 
account of local opinion derived primarily from the need to forestall criticisms which might 
otherwise emerge in the local press. On the other hand, the principle that the local press should be 
free was for Macaulay a matter of ideology. 
2 9
 See also Merry (1991, p. 909), reviewing The Political Economy of Law, by Ghai et al. (1987). 
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on the local population. A second example is the provision added to the Criminal 
Code Ordinance of 1936, in the later drafting stages, to provide the government with 
a somewhat vague and embracing power to punish an act "which may cause or tend 
to a public mischief on the grounds that " 'it might be useful here, particularly in 
time of disturbances ! 3 0 "' . This provision is somewhat reminiscent of the vagrancy 
laws in early English history; the vagueness of which has been seen as providing a 
legal basis for the control of populations perceived as dangerous to the estab-
lishment31. Thus colonial legal history is replete with evidence in support of the 
conflict model32. 
"Fortuitousness" is also on occasion a feature of colonial legislation. Certain 
developments appear to have been attributable to poor communication systems, 
while errors (due partly to ignorance of the law in the mother country) have 
sometimes exercised a lasting influence33. Such features, however, appear to play 
only a secondary role in colonial legislation too. 
The overriding character of much colonial legislation, on the other hand, seems 
rather to accord with the bureaucratic model. The two possible forms which this 
model may assume - the "enlightened" as compared with the "obfuscated" 
bureaucracy - may apply with greater force to colonial rather than to non-colonial 
administrations, for the personnel concerned operated in a greater degree of 
isolation and with greater freedom from the pressures of "checks and balances" 
prevailing in the mother country34. The following section will develop these variants 
of administrative/ legislative styles as applied to various colonial regimes in the 
British Empire - notably India and Palestine35. 
AN ENLIGHTENED BUREAUCRAT - MACAULAY'S INDIAN CODE 
Thomas Macaulay (1800-1859) is a figure well-known to historians but 
seemingly neglected by sociologists of law. His unusual characteristics render the 
legal history of India a unique phenomenon. He was described by the late Professor 
Cross as "a distinguished politician and a great man of letters [ Macaulay was 
offered a Chair in history at Cambridge] but hardly a jurist"36. Nevertheless, he was 
called to the bar before entering politics and, after holding office as Secretary of the 
Board of Control of India, accepted the appointment as "Law Member" of the 
3 0
 " T h e language is that of the Attorney General, who in fact attributes the suggestion that such a 
provision be added to 'one of the leading advocates'" (Abrams, 1972, p. 45). 
3 1
 Chambliss (1964). 
3 2
 However Merry also sees the legal norms as providing constraints for the repressive systems that 
were prevalent, and as providing "arenas for resistance" (Merry, 1981, p. 917). 
3 3
 An illustration of this, albeit on the judicial rather than the legislative level, was the misinterpretation 
by Palestinian judges of the English corroboration rule in sexual assault cases; see Sebba (1968); cf. 
also Likhovski (1995, p. 341-342). 
3 4
 The British Empire was administered by the Colonial Secretaries exercising royal prerogative 
powers. Parliamentary control was thus more limited here than in respect of other areas of 
government. 
3 5
 In formal terms, Palestine was not a colony but a Mandated territory administered by Britain on 
behalf of the League of Nations. 
3 6
 Cross (1978, p. 519). However the analysis by Cross of some of the provisions of Macaulay's code 
suggests a more positive view of the latter's legal talents! 
78 LESLIE SEBBA 
Governor-General's Legislative Council. The Law Member was to be, in the words 
of James Mill (the father of John Stuart Mill) "versed in the philosophy of men and 
government"37 - a role somewhat reminiscent of Plato's philosopher-king38; this was 
a position that Macaulay himself (when a Member of Parliament) had helped to 
create under the Charter Act of 1833 - in effect India's constitution39. Macaulay 
arrived in India in 1834, and one year later it was decided that India needed a penal 
code. Although formally he was merely one of the four members of the Law 
Commission entrusted with this task, in practice "Macaulay was virtually the sole 
author" of the draft code submitted to the Governor-General some two years later40. 
Although Macaulay was on record as a critic of the utilitarians, the style of the 
penal code he drafted strongly suggests the influence of Jeremy Bentham, who had 
indeed advocated the codification of the Indian Penal Law41. According to Stokes42, 
Macaulay did not fully adhere to Bentham's political philosophy, and he "had no 
sympathy for the planned, centralized, bureaucratic state which Bentham had 
envisaged in all its minutiae" (in his Constitutional Code)43, but he internalized 
Bentham's jurisprudential concepts44. Thus Macaulay's Penal Code sought to 
maximize clarity of language and to minimize technicality. Following Bentham, he 
rejected the verbiage of the "preamble" (partly on the ground that there might be 
disagreements as to the purpose of a particular law), but instead suggested that 
consideration be given to the possibility of publishing the minutes of the Legislative 
Council so that the reasoning of the legislation could be generally known45. He 
himself published his own legislative minutes46, which have themselves become a 
minor classic. Clarity and comprehensibility - the two underlying principles of the 
code47 - were also to be achieved by providing, as an integral part of the code, 
illustrations of the principles stated therein, described by the famous jurist James 
FitzJames Stephen as "an entirely new and original method of legislative expres-
sion"48. This approach seems to have been aimed at reducing judicial discretion - in 
accordance with classical penal law doctrine: precedents were effectively being set 
in advance. In particular, there was perceived to be a need to remove the confusion 
3 7
 Stokes (1959, p. 178). 
3 8
 Stokes (1959, p. 176-177) describes Mill's Benthamite concept of the legislator: "His pedigree is that 
of the eighteenth-century philosophe, and it reaches back to Solon. Legislation is a science, a task for 
the ablest philosophic mind, a subject for dispassionate study and expert knowledge...". 
3 9
 On the dual control of India by the East India Company and the British Parliament, see Cross 
(1978:520, fn.3). 
4 0
 Cross (1978, p. 522); Dhagamwar (1992, p. 7). 
4 1
 Jain (1977). James and John Stuart Mill were also highly involved in Indian afffairs: see Stokes 
(1959). 
4 2
 Stokes (1959, p. 192). 
4 3
 Cf. also Edward Livingston, author of the Louisiana Code, who believed in extensive state 
intervention to prevent crime (Kadish, 1978). 
4 4
 The differentiation between political and jurisprudential philosophy may not always be clear. Thus 
Stokes (1959, p. 213) attributes to Macaulay a "grandiose conception of a pyramid of codes". Here 
the jurisprudential thinking seems to merge with the political philosophy. 
4 5
 Dharker(1946). 
4 6
 See Dharker (1946). 
4 7
 See the Law Commissioners' letter which accompanied their submission of the code (Dharker, 1946, 
p. 264). 
4 8
 Cross (1978, p. 524). 
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caused by the application of religious criminal law (Muslim in some areas, Hindu in 
others) upon which colonial Regulations had been superimposed49. In his 
parliamentary speech on the Charter Bill, Macaulay had advocated "uniformity 
where you can have it, diversity where you must have it - but at all costs 
certainty"50. 
Further, while a patriot, Macaulay did not believe that existing English law was 
perfect. Macaulay's code was influenced primarily by English law - it was 
subsequently described by Sir James FitzJames Stephen as "the criminal law of 
England freed from all technicalities and superfluities..." - but the departures were 
so extensive that it might be better regarded as "an entirely new thing"51. For, 
following the ethos of the utilitarians, the code was intended to meet universal 
criteria. In the spirit of Bentham's Codification Proposal, "the law-giver like Solon 
was to be a foreigner, versed in the universal principles of legislation, and free from 
local prejudice and interest"52. It thus also incorporated a number of provisions of 
the recently drafted Louisiana Code, as well as the French Penal Code - both, in 
turn, influenced by Bentham53. 
Moreover, although under Benthamite principles "local knowledge was of minor 
importance"54, and Macaulay believed in the superiority of European values over 
Indian, Macaulay did take account of the fact that he was legislating not only for the 
European settlers, but also for the native Indians. It was therefore his policy to 
ensure that opportunity be provided for the expression of comments on any 
proposed legislation. While the time taken to draft the penal code - as well as the 
additional twenty-three years which elapsed until it was finally enacted - allowed 
plenty of time for reactions in the instant case, Macaulay's standing orders for the 
proceedings of the Legislative Council established a general principle to the effect 
that a period of six weeks was to elapse between the promulgation of draft laws and 
their enactment, so that local public opinion could he taken into account55 (This 
concept had in principle been laid down by the "Court of Directors"). However, this 
six week delay may generally have been of little assistance to most of the natives 
since pending bills, unlike the legislation finally adopted, were not translated into 
local languages56. On the other hand, Macaulay had no great sympathy for a "public 
opinion" which meant "the opinion of five hundred persons [i.e., the European 
settlers] who have no interest, feeling or taste in common with the fifty millions 
among whom they live" 5 7. 
4 9
 Stokes (1959, p. 225). "The criminality of a person's actions often depended on who he was - his 
caste, his religion, whether English or native - and on which of the presidencies he happened to be 
tried in" (Kadish, 1978, p. 1109) (Cf. Maine's description of India as "empty of law" (Jain, 1977)!). 
5 0
 Jain (1977, p. 505). 
5 1
 Kadish (1978, p. 1109-1110). 
5 2
 Stokes (1959, p. 178). 
53
 Ibid., p. 226. 
54
 Ibid., p. 178. 
5 3
 Dharker (1946, p. 22-23). 
5 6
 Dharker (1946, p. 35). As to the laws themselves, cheap vernacular copies were to be made widely 
available (Stokes, 1959, p. 194). 
5 7
 Cited in Dharker (1946, p. 37). 
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The need for codification derived in Macaulay's view less from the superiority 
of western norms but rather from the chaotic nature of the existing system58. 
Moreover, Macaulay argued in favour of having a number of Law Commissioners 
who in combination would have a greater understanding of the native population59. 
Further, while Macaulay's code seems to have incorporated little native customary 
law60, it "takes notice of, and tries to deal with, some of the special problems of 
India"61. 
Macaulay's objective of the introduction of a new body of law met with "a storm 
of criticism" on the part of the judicial establishment. In the words of a 
contemporary Anglo-Indian judge, the code was seen as "calculated to produce a 
degree of confusion and difficulty which has never yet been found in administering 
the criminal justice of any civilised country"62. Civil servants questioned "the 
wisdom of enacting a law which declined to draw exclusively upon any one system 
of law, choosing instead either to borrow from several, or to rely on abstract theories 
of jurisprudence"63. Such objections, coupled with the resignation of Macaulay in 
1838 and other new appointments in the Indian administration64, account for the 
delay in the code's adoption. Moreover, subsequent administrations sought - and 
sometimes effected - their own modifications to the Code. In the circumstances it is 
perhaps surprising that, more than two decades after Macaulay's draft was 
completed (and one year after his death), the Code was actually adopted - thanks in 
part to the professional editing by Sir Barnes Peacock, a subsequent "Law 
Member"65. 
Macaulay's enlightened rationality was reflected in many of his views. He was 
against capital and corporal punishment, and the use of the criminal code to restrict 
civil liberties66. He looked favourably on the possibility of eventual self-
determination on the part of the Indian people. While emphasising the importance of 
exporting British products and "the diffusion of European civilisation", he took the 
view that it would be "far better for us that the people of India were well-governed 
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 See above; and see Macaulay's speech to Parliament on the enactment of the Charter Act (Jain, 1977, 
p. 504). 
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 See Dharker (1946, p. 256-257). The Commission would therefore comprise "partly persons sent 
down from England and partly members of the Civil Service" (Macaulay, ibid). However, although 
Macaulay held the view that native Indians would eventually hold public office, he did not specify 
that these were the "members of the civil service" he had in mind here. 
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and independent of us, than ill-governed and subject to us"67. He also insisted on the 
principle of a free press, and the denial of legal privileges to Europeans - principles 
which rendered him highly unpopular in certain quarters. Finally, in the matter of 
local taxation for local purposes, Macaulay was insistent that the local population 
should decide68. 
In contrasting Macaulay's enlightened views with the conservativism of many of 
his critics it should not be forgotten that in the last analysis the model described was 
nevertheless a bureaucratic one. In spite of the concession to "public opinion" and 
the incorporation of various extraneous legal concepts, Macaulay was ultimately 
imposing a foreign (in this case English-based) legal system on an indigenous 
population69. He was, of course, unaware of the approach of the later anthropo-
logical school, or of contemporary sociological approaches which question both the 
practicality and the ethics of the imposition of so-called "advanced" legal systems 
on so-called "backward" peoples70. However, while he did indeed believe in the 
superiority of western values and education71, the legal codes he wished to impose 
were, as noted above, perceived by him (following the utilitarian philosophy) to be 
universal rather than culture-specific. 
OBFUSCATED BUREAUCRATS - THE PALESTINE MODEL 
The pioneering achievements of Thomas Macaulay - in terms both of his 
concept of legislation and the content of his code - did not provide the model for 
future colonial developments. "Whereas the Indian Penal Code was the work of a 
commission of some of the most distinguished lawyers of the early years of 
Victorian England who were deeply imbued with Benthamite inspiration and 
reforming zeal...the average colonial Criminal Code has come out of the Attorney-
General's chamber probably as the work of a legal draftsman"72. The expansion of 
the British Empire and the consequent proliferation of colonial legislation was 
doubtless a crucial factor in the process of bureaucratization; perhaps also the 
intellectual climate of the late Victorian and subsequent period could not rival that 
of the early nineteenth century. Whatever the explanation, the colonial code model 
most widely adopted during the nineteenth century was not the Indian Penal Code 
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but that of Queensland, which was based on the well-known Digest of the Criminal 
Law produced by the conservative judge and jurist James Fitzjames Stephen73 -
published in 1877, and intended as "a first step towards a Code"74. 
The Queensland Criminal Code, adopted in 1899, was largely the work of Sir 
Samuel Griffith. Like Macaulay, Griffith, too, was a lawyer (when he drafted the 
code he was Chief Justice of Queensland), a politician and a man of letters (known 
for his translation of Dante's Divine Comedy). However, he lacked Macaulay's 
inspiration and innovative orientation. In Griffith's view, codification meant 
essentially "the reduction of the existing law to an orderly written system", for 
which purpose he relied heavily on Stephen's Digest and the subsequent Draft Code 
of the Royal Commission75, although a greater degree of creativity was evident in 
his drafting of the general principles of responsibility76. 
Another codifier emerging in the late nineteenth century was R.S. Wright. He, 
too, had a background in the classics, and published books in this field77. While still 
a young man he was invited by the Colonial Office to draft a penal code for Jamaica, 
with the intention that it should be subsequently adapted to the needs of other 
colonies78. In making a detailed comparison between the codes of Wright and 
Stephen "the two principal rivals in codifying the criminal law in the British Empire 
in the second half of the nineteenth century"79, Friedland found the former to be 
more progressive and "in many, if not most, respects... a much better Code"80. 
Perhaps because of its progressive elements, Wright's code was not adopted in 
Jamaica; and while widely praised was eventually adopted only in British 
Honduras, Tobago and the Gold Coast81, in sharp contrast to the widely adopted 
Queensland code. 
It might be arguable that the adoption of Stephen's code, designed for the 
population of England (although never adopted in that country) was in principle not 
totally unsuitable for Queensland, an Australian state, composed mainly of migrants 
from the mother country or their descendants. What, however, could the cultural or 
normative standards of such a population have in common with those of the 
tribesmen of Nigeria, or the Turkish-Greek or Arab-Jewish melanges of Cyprus and 
Palestine respectively ? For the same code (subject to relatively few modifications) 
was adopted in all these locations, as well as a dozen others82. Thus, the "Palestine 
Model" of the present sub-heading is in fact the Queensland model; but it is its 
adoption in Palestine - the direct importation of an already existing code to a colony 
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(or in this case a mandated territory) with a heterogeneous population - that 
characterizes the phenomenon being described here. 
The replication of this version of the English criminal law in numerous colonies 
had the overriding advantage of familiarity and therefore convenience for the 
majority of the administrators - whether they arrived from the mother country or 
from another colony which had already adopted this model, as well as being 
acceptable to the Colonial Office officials83. In the Palestine case, the decision-
making process by which the code was adopted combined this bureaucratic 
approach with an autocratic one, as reflected in the Palestinian High Commis-
sioner's declaration84 that "I have decided on the advice of the Chief Justice and the 
Attorney General to adopt the Cyprus Criminal Code as the model". 
Various pressures were exercised in favour of a more flexible approach. In 
Palestine (unlike India) a unified system of penal law, namely the Ottoman Law -
itself strongly influenced by the French Law - had been in force for a long period of 
time and was familiar to much of the local population. However, it is clear that when 
Attorney-General Bentwich argued in favour of a more extensive retention of 
Ottoman Law provisions, in order to take such factors into account, he was regarded 
as a nuisance85 . In the event, however, a few of the Ottoman provisions were 
retained, notably relating to homicide86. 
In some colonies, moreover, support was expressed specifically for the Indian 
model. However, it seems that the very characteristics which made this code 
attractive to some - namely, its attempt to improve upon and simplify the existing 
common law, taking into account its prospective application to indigenous 
populations - rendered it unattractive to conservative bureaucratic minds. In this 
connection the detailed account of the adoption of the Queensland model in the 
African colonies in preference to the Indian code87 makes fascinating reading. 
In 1904-1905, Sir Walter Egerton, the High commissioner of Southern Nigeria, 
strongly favoured the introduction of the Indian model into that colony. The legal 
advisers to the Secretary of State for the colonies (named Cox and Riley) favoured 
the Queensland model, which was the basis of the Northern Nigerian code (drafted 
during this period by Chief Justice Gollan). Egerton's reaction was strident: 
"I cannot doubt that any unbiased person will consider the Indian Code far 
simpler and better suited to the needs of an uncivilized or semi-civilized population 
(sic!). The population of India has many things in common with the population of 
Lagos and Southern Nigeria. The latter has nothing in common with the population 
of Queensland"88. 
The Secretary of State himself (Lord Elgin) supported this view: 
"The Indian Penal Code has stood the test of fifty years with wonderfully few 
alterations. It was specifically designed for a semi-civilized population by one of 
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the greatest intellects of the nineteenth century... Surely it is a mistake to now 
adopt an untried Code designed for a white population in view of this Code which 
has proved so successful in India and has been extended to various Crown 
Colonies"89. 
This last passage drew the comment "only Eastern colonies" from the legal 
advisers, who were able to ensure that no new code was adopted at that time, paving 
the way for the application of the Queensland model on the amalgamation of 
Northern and Southern Nigeria a few years later (in 1914). 
The conservative bureaucratic view consistently prevailed in the course of the 
debate on the legislation of African penal codes. The most telling illustration is that 
of East Africa. These territories initially adopted Macaulay's Code90. This was 
clearly anathema to the bureaucrats, who objected to the placing of "white men 
under laws intended for a coloured population despotically governed", and in this 
instance they received some support from the European settlers91. A single notorious 
trial, in which a defendant perpetrating a fatal assault received a light sentence, 
provided the excuse for the repeal of the Macaulay codes and their substitution by 
the Nigerian (Queensland) model. Both the Governor and the Chief Justice of Kenya 
expressed reservations about this change, but Bushe, the legal adviser to the 
Secretary of State, "was adamant" - and the retrogressive measure was adopted. 
As in the Southern Nigeria case referred to above, this episode illustrates the 
triumph of bureaucracy over rationality92. It also provides a link between the law-
making process of the colonial and democratic regimes - the role of the legal adviser 
being predominant in both. The "Yes, Minister" phenomenon seems not to be 
peculiar to certain types of contemporary democratic regimes93, but seems also to 
have manifested itself in the colonial context. 
POST-COLONIAL LEGISLATION 
As noted in the opening section of this article, one of the interesting features of 
post-colonial regimes is that, having finally freed themselves of the shackles of 
colonial domination, with (under many analyses) its concomitant imposition of a 
presumptively oppressive normative system designed to serve the interests of the 
colonial power - relatively little is done on the part of these new regimes to replace 
this system. The post-colonial legislative system may thus differ little from the 
colonial system. 
Thus, in the case of Palestine/Israel, although a large number of amendments 
have been made to the Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936, and a Hebrew formulation 
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was finally enacted in 1977, much of the substance of this Code remains in force 
today - half a century after independence, while the "General Part" was reformed 
only in 1994. Moreover other enactments, such as the Police Ordinance, the Prisons 
Ordinance and the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, although translated into Hebrew 
and frequently amended, still bear the Mandatory nomenclature of "Ordinance". It 
seems that Israel is by no means unique in this experience, and that other ex-colonial 
nations retained their colonial criminal codes for several decades after indepen-
dence94. 
The question which is raised here is, therefore, as follows: How is it that the 
white settlers, the African tribesmen, the Jews and the Arabs, having thrown off the 
yoke of imperial domination, have been so slow to repeal the modified version of the 
English criminal law so arbitrarily imposed upon them? This question seems 
pertinent whichever theory of colonial legislation is the valid one - whether such 
legislation constituted an expression of a policy of domination and exploitation, 
whether it was the fruit of bureaucratic pressures, or whether it was the result of 
chance. Before considering some possible explanations for the above phenomenon, 
a few observations will be made on the development of criminal law reform in post-
independence Israel. 
By and large the substantive criminal law, at least in Israel, may be said to pertain 
to "lawyer's law". The general public generally shows little interest in the definition 
of larceny, arson, or even murder - although the question of homicide in self-
defence against a background of either political or domestic violence has given rise 
to public debate, and the definition of rape, too, has been of concern to the feminist 
lobby, resulting in reforms in these areas95. Even sentencing provisions are not 
widely debated by the public, except when they raise sensitivities in the area of 
domestic violence, or where there is a "moral panic", such as periodically occurs in 
the context of drug use - particularly where minors are concerned. Such occurrences 
give rise to calls for - and sometimes to the adoption of - minimum penalties, which 
are otherwise not an integral part of Israel's criminal justice system . 
Subject to the above reservations, criminal law legislation is seen to be a matter 
for the professional personnel at the Ministry of Justice (and, where appropriate, the 
legal adviser of the appropriate ministry97) and, to a lesser extent, the legal 
community in general. Pressure to change the law may arise from judicial exposure 
of gaps in the present law, from controversial judicial interpretations of that law or 
following the recommendations of a professional committee. Alternatively, an 
activist Minister of Justice may regard law reform as a worthy political or 
professional objective. Further, since the political parties have adopted the system of 
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selecting their candidates by means of "primaries", much legislation is now initiated 
personally by "private members" - in order to demonstrate legislative activity on 
their part98. 
On the other hand, the forces operating against law reform seem to be strong. As 
noted above, criminal law reform is almost exclusively a matter of concern to 
lawyers, and lawyers, having been trained in the existing system, have a vested 
interest in the status quo. This interest may combine with interests of other kinds: an 
earlier draft for the general part of a new criminal code, incorporating a greater 
structurization of the sentencing provisions, was abandoned owing to the objections 
of the judiciary to the curtailment of their discretionary powers. On the other hand 
even during the post-colonial period reform is seen - or at least used to be seen - as 
more acceptable when it followed the lead of the English system, whether in the 
context of legislation99 or precedent. Moreover the provisions which specified that 
the Criminal Code should be interpreted in accordance with English law, and that 
gaps in the law should be filled by reference to English law, remained in effect for 
more than two decades after independence, and the Israeli legal system thus became 
weaned from this dependence relatively slowly1 0 0. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has considered various models of the legislative process, and 
particularly of codification processes' in colonial and post-colonial societies. The 
point of departure for this overview was the phenomenon whereby many post-
colonial societies have been slow to abandon codes which were imposed upon them 
by the colonial power - in the case of Israel, the Queensland-Nigeria-Cyprus-
Colonial Office criminal code - generally with only minimal concern for the local 
culture and for the previously prevailing norms. A number of alternative 
explanations will now be considered by way of explanation of this phenomenon. 
(1) One possible explanation is that legal norms are (or should be) in substance 
universal, so that the adoption of similar penal codes by different peoples is only 
natural. This seems in substance to have been the view of Macaulay and the 
Benthamites alluded to above. This view is inherent in the old concept of mala 
in se, accepted by Blackstone and others101. Some support for this view is found 
in the replications of Sellin and Wolfgang's measurement of delinquency, which 
elicited from various population samples assessments of the relative seriousness 
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of different offences, and which claimed to have arrived at similar results in 
different cultures102. However, other comparative work1 0 3 as well as much 
anthropological literature would seem to question this hypothesis. Moreover the 
conflict hypothesis referred to earlier, if valid, posits a conflict of values and 
interests within societies, thereby leaving little room for consensus among 
societies. 
(2) Another possible explanation is that whatever the legal, national and cultural 
origins of the imported code, its interpretation and application subsequently 
develop independently, so that in practice it becomes autonomous - and in effect 
indigenous. Thus, in the Palestine/Israel context, as in other colonies, the view 
was not unanimous, even during the Mandatory period, that enactments based 
upon English law should be interpreted as they would be in England104; and this 
trend naturally became stronger after Independence - particularly after the 
official severance of the interpretation provisions from the English law 1 0 5. 
Moreover, if it were surmised that the Criminal Code Ordinance would be 
interpreted in accordance with the interpretations which prevailed in the other 
colonies, or former colonies, in which the same or a similar code was in force, 
Abrams (1972) and Shachar (1979) have pointed out that the Israel judiciary was 
almost totally unaware of the case-law of those other jurisdictions; and in some 
areas new interpretations have emerged, supposedly attuned to Israeli condi-
tions. The issuance of the official Hebrew version of the Code in 1977 would 
lend further support to the concept of an independent development, as, a fortiori, 
would the numerous legislative amendments which have taken place since the 
original Code was introduced - and in particular those introduced since the 
independence of the state. 
(3) A third explanation for the post-colonial society's adherence to the colonial 
norms might be that whatever the prior values and normative patterns of a 
society, the imposition of a new code will have a momentum of its own, and will 
give rise to an internalisation of the values underlying that code. This view is 
perhaps implicit in the Austinian "command" theory of law, and is reflected in 
the view of Andenaes (1974), who has argued that sanctioning principles laid 
down by the legislature infiltrate into the normative attitudes of subsequent 
generations. Following this line of argument, even if the colonial societies 
differed culturally and normatively at the time when the codes were adopted, 
both from the mother country and from the other societies in which the code's 
norms prevailed, during the course of time they would become similar, as a result 
of the application of the code to that society. 
This analysis raises the issue of the relationship between legal norms and social 
or cultural norms, for it assumes that social norms are determined by legal norms 
rather than vice versa. While the "social engineering" school attributed to the law 
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some potential for social change, this was generally applied within the parameters of 
a particular political culture106. Moreover legal philosophers with a more historical 
or cultural orientation, such as Savigny or Sumner, would certainly question such a 
vision of socio-legal development107 as would the post-modernists108. 
(4) Yet another approach would accept the existence of cultural and normative 
diversity among nations and would deny the power of an imposed law either to 
adapt itself to the local normative system or to remove the diversity among the 
different systems. It would rather argue that a gap between the official legal 
norms and popular norms was created by the imperial bureaucracy during the 
colonial period and that this gap was maintained following independence by a 
"New Class" of lawyer-bureaucrats, reluctant to alter a system with which they 
were familiar. 
In principle this approach is consistent with the bureaucratic model of 
legislation described earlier in the article. In many instances, however, it may also 
be consistent with a conflict analysis. For while on the one hand, as noted above, the 
colonial legislation enacted during the imperial period may be perceived as an 
instrument for the subjugation of the local population, and thus no longer relevant, 
in many former colonies the tension between a dominant and a native population (or 
minority) remains - and the colonial legal structure will be serving the interests not 
merely of a bureaucracy, but of a class, race or ethnic group109. 
The more valid of the explanations for the retention of the colonial codes in 
general, and in Israel in particular, seems to be some combination of the second 
approach, which lays emphasis on the autonomous development of the codes, and 
the last one, whether in its bureaucratic or its conflict form110, which emphasises the 
interest of the powers-that-be in the continuity of the colonial system. 
FINAL NOTE 
A detailed study of the nature and history of the codes of a variety of former 
colonies might provide answers to a number of questions, and enable some 
hypotheses to be tested in connection with the interrelationship of some of the 
variables referred to here. For example: How far is there a connection between the 
duration of the retention of the colonial code and its content? It could be 
hypothesized here that a more "universalist" code, drafted in the spirit of the 
utilitarians, would endure longer than a code based exclusively upon the law of the 
imperial power. Secondly, have the codes been longer retained in former colonies in 
which there is a disadvantaged (usually native) minority ? A positive finding would 
be hypothesized here. Finally, it may also be of interest to study the connection 
between the nature of the independence process (in particular the degree of conflict 
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involved) and the other variables referred to 1 1 1. Here it would be hypothesized that a 
smoother passage to independence (evolutionary, rather than revolutionary) would 
increase the probability that the code would be retained. Further research is required 
in order to explore these issues. 
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